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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
)In the Matter of )
)American Institute of Certified ) 
Public Accountants, )
) a corporation. )
)
_________________________________ )
Docket No. C. 3 2 9 7
COMPLAINT
Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act and by virtue of the authority vested in it by said Act, the 
Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, a 
corporation, has violated the provisions of Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, and it appearing to the Federal 
Trade Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would 
be in the public interest, hereby issues this complaint, stating 
its charges as follows:
PARAGRAPH ONE: Respondent American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants ("respondent" or "AICPA") is a corporation 
formed pursuant to the laws of the District of Columbia. 
Respondent is a voluntary association of approximately 264,000 
certified public accountants ("CPAs"), who comprise approximately 
three-quarters of the CPAs in the United States. Its principal 
business office is located at 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New 
York, New York 10036-8775.
PARAGRAPH TWO: For purposes of this complaint, the 
following definitions shall apply:
A. "Attest service" means providing (1) any audit, (2) any 
review of a financial statement, (3) any compilation of a 
financial statement when the certified public accountant ("CPA") 
expects, or reasonably might expect, that a third party will use 
the compilation and the CPA does not disclose a lack of 
independence, and (4) any examination of prospective financial 
information;
B. "Commission" means compensation, except a referral fee, 
for recommending or referring any product or service to be 
supplied by another person;
C. "Contingent fee" means a fee established for the 
performance of any service pursuant to an arrangement in which no 
fee will be charged unless a specified finding or result is 
attained, or in which the amount of the fee is otherwise 
dependent upon the finding or result of such service; and
D. "Referral fee" means compensation for recommending or 
referring any service of a CPA to any person.
PARAGRAPH THREE: Except to the extent competition has been 
restrained as herein alleged, many of respondent's members in the 
practice of public accounting have been and are now in 
competition among themselves and with other CPAs.
PARAGRAPH FOUR: Respondent is a corporation organized for 
the purpose, among others, of guarding and fostering its members' 
economic interests, and is engaged in substantial activities that 
further its members' pecuniary interests. As a result of such 
purpose and activities, respondent is a "corporation," within the 
meaning of Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 44.
PARAGRAPH FIVE: The acts and practices of AICPA, including 
those herein alleged, are in commerce or affect commerce within 
the meaning of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
PARAGRAPH SIX: Respondent has agreed, combined or conspired 
with its members or other persons, or has acted as a combination 
of its members, to restrain competition among CPAs in the United 
States by, among other things:
A. Restricting the methods CPAs may use to set their fees, 
including prohibiting the offering or rendering of professional 
services for a contingent fee or a commission to a person for 
whom the CPA is not also performing attest services. Under these 
restrictions, CPAs are or may be deterred from, among other 
things, (1) assisting a state government to obtain a Medicare 
refund from the United States Government pursuant to a contract 
whereby the CPA receives no fee if the state receives no refund, 
or (2) assisting a consumer by preparing a financial plan 
pursuant to a contract under which the CPA will be compensated by 
receiving commissions from the sellers of any products that are 
purchased by the consumer;
B. Restricting truthful, nondeceptive advertising by CPAs, 
including, but not limited to:
1. Self-laudatory or comparative advertising;
2. Testimonial or endorsement advertising; and
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3. Advertising not considered by AICPA to be 
professionally dignified or in good taste.
Under these restrictions, CPAs are or may be deterred from, among 
other things, truthfully advertising that they are ’’real tax 
experts,” that they offer ”the expertise of a large national 
firm," or that "John Smith says that their CPA firm was 
particularly responsive to his needs.”
C. Restricting solicitation of clients by CPAs, including, 
but not limited to, (1) restricting direct solicitation of 
potential clients, and (2) prohibiting the payment or acceptance 
of referral fees. Under these restrictions, CPAs are or may be 
deterred from, among other things, soliciting clients by mail, 
paying marketing firms to assist in soliciting potential clients, 
and granting discounts to clients for referring other clients to 
them; and
D. Restricting the use of nondeceptive trade names by CPAs. 
Under this restriction, CPAs are or may be deterred from, among 
other things, using names like ”Suburban Computer Services” or 
”Smith and Jones, CPAs, Tax Services," even when the name 
truthfully reflects the services provided by the CPAs.
PARAGRAPH SEVEN: In furtherance of the agreement, combi­
nation, or conspiracy described in PARAGRAPH SIX, AICPA has 
promulgated, maintained, and enforced a Code of Professional 
Conduct, including, but not limited to, Rules 302, 502, 503 and 
505, and Interpretations 502-1 and 502-2 thereof.
PARAGRAPH EIGHT: Respondent’s actions described in 
PARAGRAPHS SIX and SEVEN have had, or have the tendency and 
capacity to have, the following effects, among others:
A. Restraining competition among CPAs with respect to 
price, quality, and other terms of service;
B. Depriving consumers of information about the 
availability, price, and quality of CPA services; and
C. Injuring consumers by depriving them of the benefits of 
free and open competition among CPAs.
PARAGRAPH NINE: The agreement, combination, or conspiracy 
and the acts and practices described above constitute unfair 
methods of competition and unfair acts or practices in violation 
of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 
15 U.S.C. § 45. Such agreement, combination or conspiracy, or 
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the effects thereof, is continuing and will continue absent the 
entry against respondent of appropriate relief.
WHEREFORE, THE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Federal Trade 
Commission, on this twenty-sixth day of July, 1990, issues its 
Complaint against the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants.
By the Commission. Commissioners Azcuenaga and Owen 
dissented.
Donald S. Clark 
Secretary
SEAL
ISSUED: July 26, 1990
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
COMMISSIONERS:
Janet D. Steiger, Chairman 
Terry Calvani 
Mary L. Azcuenaga 
Andrew J. Strenio, Jr. 
Deborah K. Owen
)In the Matter of )
) American Institute of Certified ) DOCKET NO. c.3297
Public Accountants, )
) a corporation. ) DECISION AND ORDER
)
_____________________________________ )
The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an 
investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent 
named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been 
furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft of complaint which 
the Bureau of Competition proposed to present to the Commission 
for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, 
would charge respondent with violation of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act; and
The respondent, its attorneys, and counsel for the 
Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a 
consent order, an admission by the respondent of all the 
jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid draft of 
complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for 
settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by 
respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such 
complaint, and waivers and other provisions as required by the 
Commission's rules; and
The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and 
having determined that it had reason to believe that the 
respondent has violated the said Act, and that complaint should 
issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon 
accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement 
on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, and having 
duly considered the comments filed thereafter by interested 
persons pursuant to § 2.34 of its Rules, and having duly 
considered the recommendations of its staff to modify the consent 
agreement pursuant to the comments received and the supplemental 
letter agreement executed by the respondent's counsel, now in 
further conformity with the procedure prescribed in § 2.34 of its
Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the 
following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order, 
as modified:
1. Respondent American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants is a corporation organized, existing and doing 
business under and by virtue of the laws of the District of 
Columbia, with its office and principal place of business located 
at 1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10036-8775.
2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the 
subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the 
proceeding is in the public interest.
ORDER
I.
IT IS ORDERED that for purposes of this order the following 
definitions shall apply:
A. "AICPA" means American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and its Board of Directors, Council, committees, task 
forces, officers, representatives, agents, employees, successors, 
and assigns;
B. "Attest service" means providing (1) any audit, (2) any 
review of a financial statement, (3) any compilation of a 
financial statement when the certified public accountant ("CPA”) 
expects, or reasonably might expect, that a third party will use 
the compilation and the CPA does not disclose a lack of 
independence, and (4) any examination of prospective financial 
information;
C. "Audit" means an examination of financial statements of 
a person by a CPA, conducted in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards, to determine whether, in the CPA's 
opinion, the statements conform with generally accepted 
accounting principles or, if applicable, with another 
comprehensive basis of accounting;
D. "Commission" means compensation, except a referral fee, 
for recommending or referring any product or service to be 
supplied by another person;
E. "Compilation of a financial statement" means presenting 
in the form of a financial statement information that is the 
representation of any other person without the CPA's undertaking 
to express any assurance on the statement;
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F. "Contingent fee” means a fee established for the 
performance of any service pursuant to an arrangement in which no 
fee will be charged unless a specified finding or result is 
attained, or in which the amount of the fee is otherwise 
dependent upon the finding or result of such service;
G. "Disciplinary action" means revocation or suspension 
of, or refusal to grant, membership, or the imposition of a 
reprimand, probation, constructive comment, or any other penalty 
or condition;
H. "Examination of prospective financial information" 
means an evaluation by a CPA of (1) a forecast or projection, 
(2) the support underlying the assumptions in the forecast or 
projection, (3) whether the presentation of the forecast or 
projection is in conformity with AICPA presentation guidelines, 
and (4) whether the assumptions in the forecast or projection 
provide a reasonable basis for the forecast or projection;
I. "Forecast" means prospective financial statements that 
present, to the best of the responsible party’s knowledge and 
belief, an entity's expected financial position, results of 
operations, and changes in financial position or cash flows that 
are based on the responsible party's assumptions reflecting 
conditions it expects to exist and the course of action it 
expects to take;
J. "Person" means any natural person, corporation, 
partnership, unincorporated association, or other entity;
K. "Projection" means prospective financial statements 
that present, to the best of the responsible party's knowledge 
and belief, given one or more hypothetical assumptions, an 
entity's expected financial position, results of operations, and 
changes in financial position or cash flows that are based on the 
responsible party's assumptions reflecting conditions it expects 
would exist and the course of action it expects would be taken 
given such hypothetical assumptions;
L. "Referral fee" means compensation for recommending or 
referring any service of a CPA to any person;
M. "Review" means to perform an inquiry and analytical 
procedures that permit a CPA to determine whether there is a 
reasonable basis for expressing limited assurance that there are 
no material modifications that should be made to financial 
statements in order for them to be in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles or, if applicable, with another 
comprehensive basis of accounting; and




IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that AICPA, directly, indirectly, or 
through any person or other device, in connection with its 
activities in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in 
Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, shall forthwith 
cease and desist from:
A. Restricting, regulating, impeding, declaring unethical, 
advising members against, or interfering with any of the 
following practices by any CPAs
1. The offering or rendering of professional services 
for, or the receipt of, a contingent fee by a CPA, 
provided that AICPA may prohibit the engaging to 
render or rendering by a CPA for a contingent fee: 
(a) of professional services for, or the receipt 
of such a fee from, any person for whom the CPA 
also performs attest services, during the period 
of the attest services engagement and the period 
covered by any historical financial statements 
involved in such attest services; and (b) for the 
preparation of original or amended tax returns or 
claims for tax refunds;
2. The offering or rendering of professional services 
for, or the receipt of, a disclosed commission by 
a CPA, provided that the engaging to render or 
rendering of professional services by a CPA for a 
commission for, or the receipt of a commission 
from, any person for whom the CPA also performs 
attest services may be prohibited by the AICPA 
during the period of the attest services 
engagement and the period covered by any 
historical financial statements involved in such 
attest services;
3. The payment or acceptance of any disclosed 
referral fee;
4. The solicitation of any potential client by any 
means, including direct solicitation;
5. Advertising, including, but not limited to:
(a) any self-laudatory or comparative claim;
(b) any testimonial or endorsement; and
(c) any advertisement not considered by AICPA to 
be professionally dignified or in good taste; 
and
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6. The use of any trade name;
PROVIDED THAT nothing contained in this order shall prohibit 
AICPA from formulating, adopting, disseminating, and enforcing 
reasonable ethical guidelines governing the conduct of its 
members with respect to solicitation, advertising or trade names, 
including unsubstantiated representations, that AICPA reasonably 
believes would be false or deceptive within the meaning of 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act;
B. Taking or threatening to take formal or informal 
disciplinary action, or conducting any investigation or inquiry, 
applying standards in violation of this order;
C. Adopting or maintaining any rule, regulation, interpre­
tation, ethical ruling, concept, policy, or course of conduct 
that is in violation of this order;
D. Inducing, urging, encouraging, or assisting any associ­
ation of accountants to engage in any act that would violate this 
order if done by AICPA provided, however, that nothing in this 
order shall prohibit AICPA from soliciting action by any federal, 
state or local governmental entity; and
E. Applying or interpreting any other language contained 
in the Code of Professional Conduct or its successors in a manner 
that would violate this order;
PROVIDED THAT this order shall not prohibit AICPA from:
(a) suspending membership in AICPA if:
a member's certificate as a CPA or license or 
permit to practice as such or to practice public 
accounting is suspended as a disciplinary measure 
by any governmental entity;
ii. a member's registration as an investment adviser 
is suspended by the SEC;
iii. a member's registration as a broker-dealer is 
suspended by the SEC or by any state agency acting 
pursuant to any applicable state law or regulation 
relating to the issuance, registration, purchase 
or sale of securities; or
iv. a member is suspended from practicing before the 
IRS,
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but any such suspension by AICPA shall terminate upon 
reinstatement of any such certificate, license, permit, 
registration, or authorization to practice; or
(b) terminating membership in AICPA if:
i. a member's certificate as a CPA or license or 
permit to practice as such or to practice public 
accounting is revoked, withdrawn or cancelled as a 
disciplinary measure by any governmental entity;
ii. a member's registration as an investment adviser 
is revoked by the SEC;
iii. a member's registration as a broker-dealer is 
revoked by the SEC or by any state agency acting 
pursuant to any applicable state law or regulation 
relating to the issuance, registration, purchase 
or sale of securities;
iv. a member is subject to a final judgment of 
conviction for criminal fraud or for a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; 
or
v. a member is disbarred from practicing before the 
IRS.
III.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that AICPA shall:
A. Distribute a copy of this order and an announcement in 
the form shown in Appendix A, within thirty (30) days after this 
order becomes final, to all personnel, agents, or representatives 
of AICPA having responsibilities with respect to the subject 
matter of this order and secure from each such person a signed 
statement acknowledging receipt of this order and said 
announcement;
B. Distribute by mail a copy of this order and an 
announcement in the form shown in Appendix A, within thirty (30) 
days after this order becomes final, to each of its members and 
to each state society of certified public accountants;
C. Publish this order and an announcement in the form 
shown in Appendix A, within sixty (60) days after this order 
becomes final, in an issue of the "Journal of Accountancy," 
AICPA's monthly journal, or in any successor publication, in the 
same type size normally used for articles which are published in 
the "Journal of Accountancy" or in any successor publication;
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D. Within ninety (90) days after this order becomes final, 
publish and distribute to all members of AICPA and to all 
personnel, agents, or representatives of AICPA having responsi­
bilities with respect to the subject matter of this order revised 
versions of AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct, Bylaws, 
concepts of professional ethics, interpretations, ethical 
rulings, or other policy statements or guidelines of AICPA which 
(1) delete any material that is inconsistent with Part II of this 
order and (2) otherwise comply with this order;
E. File with the Federal Trade Commission within sixty 
(60) days after this order becomes final, one (1) year after this 
order becomes final, and at such other times as the Federal Trade 
Commission may by written notice to AICPA request, a report in 
writing setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it 
has complied and is complying with this order;
F. For a period of five (5) years after this order becomes 
final, maintain and make available to the Federal Trade 
Commission staff for inspection and copying, upon reasonable 
notice, records adequate to describe in detail any action taken 
in connection with any activity covered by Parts II and III of 
this order, including any written communications and any 
summaries of oral communications, and any disciplinary action; 
and
G. Notify the Federal Trade Commission at least thirty 
(30) days prior to any proposed changes in AICPA, such as 
dissolution or reorganization resulting in the emergence of a 
successor corporation or association, or any other change in the 
corporation or association which may affect compliance 
obligations arising out of this order.
By the Commission. Commissioners Azcuenaga and Owen dissented.
SEAL Donald S. Clark
Secretary






As you may be aware, the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants ("AICPA") has entered into a consent agreement 
with the Federal Trade Commission that became final on [date]. 
The order issued pursuant to the consent agreement provides that 
AICPA may not interfere if its members wish to engage in any of 
the following activities:
(1) accepting contingent fees from nonattest clients;
(2) accepting disclosed commissions for products or 
services supplied by third parties to nonattest 
clients;
(3) engaging in advertising and solicitation;
(4) making or accepting disclosed payments for referring 
potential clients to a CPA; or
(5) using trade names.
The order allows AICPA to prohibit its members from 
accepting contingent fees for preparing original or amended tax 
returns or claims for tax refunds.
The order does not prevent AICPA from formulating reasonable 
ethical guidelines prohibiting solicitation, advertising or trade 
names that it reasonably believes would be false or deceptive 
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.
In particular, without attempting to be all-inclusive, the 
agreement between AICPA and the Federal Trade Commission means 
that as long as its members do not engage in falsehood or 
deception, AICPA cannot prevent or discourage them from engaging 
in the following practices, among others:
(a) in-person solicitation of prospective clients;
(b) self-laudatory advertising;
(c) comparative advertising;
(d) testimonial or endorsement advertising;
(e) advertising that some members may believe is 
 "undignified" or lacking in "good taste";
(f) assisting any state government that is not an attest 
client in claiming a Medicare refund pursuant to a 
contingent fee contract;
(g) preparing financial plans for nonattest clients for 
which members will be compensated by commissions from 
the sellers of products or services that such clients 
purchase;
(h) using trade names, such as "Suburban Tax Services";
(i) paying referral fees to marketing firms that assist 
members in soliciting potential clients; and
(j) offering clients a discount for referring a prospective 
client.
For more specific information, you should refer to the FTC 
order itself. A copy of the order is enclosed.
Philip B. Chenok 
President
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
 SEPARATE STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER AZCUENAGA, 
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART, 
in American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
Docket C— 3297
The Commission today accepts a consent order that, among 
other things, prevents the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants ("AICPA"), through its Code of Professional Conduct, 
from requiring that its members refrain from using coercion, 
overreaching or harassment to solicit clients and from requiring 
that its members forgo certain fee arrangements that may create 
conflicts of interest. The Commission challenges provisions in 
the AICPA code that have no anticompetitive effect, that are far 
removed from the per se category of legal offenses and for which 
AICPA arguably has good reason. I dissent.
AICPA's rule on solicitation prohibits "the use of coercion, 
overreaching or harassing conduct." The rule is not unlawful on 
its face, nor is there any evidence that the rule has been used 
improperly, much less unlawfully. The majority invalidates the 
rule, apparently on the theory that the purpose of the rule is to 
discourage all forms of solicitation. The Commission lacks even 
the proverbial shred of evidence to support this theory. The 
sparse information we have shows instead that AICPA consistently 
responds to inquiries about the rule by stating unequivocally 
that it does not prohibit all direct, uninvited solicitation, by 
advising members to consult the dictionary definitions of 
"coercion," "overreaching" and "harassment" for general guidance 
and by offering to analyze particular facts relating to a 
proposed or questionable solicitation.
AICPA promulgated the rule as an attempt to balance the 
concerns of its members about certain kinds of direct, uninvited 
solicitation1 2 with the need for a rule that would not offend the 
antitrust laws (hardly probative evidence of an unlawful 
purpose). AICPA's refusal to interpret the solicitation rule 
except in the context of a specific fact situation also stems 
from its efforts to comply with the antitrust laws and is not 
indicative of an unlawful purpose. The implication of the
1 Some of the provisions in AICPA's Code that the 
Commission challenges can be shown to be anticompetitive and 
unlawful, and the corresponding remedies imposed by the 
Commission are appropriate. I agree with the majority that there 
is reason to believe that AICPA's restrictions on contingent fees 
(II.A.1) and advertising (II.A.5 and II.A.6) unlawfully restrain 
competition. I dissent from Paragraphs II.A.2, II.A.3 and II.A.4 
of the order.
2 Compare Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 
(1978) (state may ban in-person solicitation by lawyers for 
profit).
Commission's prohibition is that a professional association may 
not, under any circumstances, bar its members from engaging in 
coercion, overreaching or harassment. I cannot join in this 
unfortunate message.
AICPA has maintained that many of its ethical rules, 
including the rules against referral fees and commissions, are 
intended to preserve the fact as well as the appearance of 
independence and objectivity of its members. This asserted 
justification has substantial credibility particularly in the 
context of attest services. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission prohibits auditors from having joint business 
arrangements with their audit clients for this reason, and the 
majority itself partly concedes the validity of AICPA's 
justification by not challenging AICPA's ban on commissions and 
contingent fees for attest clients.
Referral fees and commissions pose the same potential 
harm — a conflict between the financial interests of the CPA and 
his client. Although consumer search costs may be reduced by 
permitting these practices, referral fees and commissions do not 
necessarily lead to lower overall costs for consumers. To 
further their own economic self-interest, CPAs may refer 
consumers for services they otherwise might not recommend, and 
any profit-maximizing CPA presumably will pass on the cost of 
referral fees to consumers. AICPA's rule against third-party 
commissions does not eliminate price competition or restrict the 
prices that the CPA charges his or her clients. Instead, the 
rule prohibits a method of payment that seems to invite a CPA to 
recommend a financial plan that would serve his own financial 
interests at least as well as those of his client. See Vogel v. 
American Society of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 1984) 
("[T]he challenged bylaw does not limit the fee [but] it merely 
outlaws a method of fee setting that seems to invite the 
appraiser to practice a fraud on his customer . . . .").
One-stop financial service is an option that some consumers 
presumably may want. This service, however, is readily available 
from other providers and, indeed, from CPAs in those states that 
permit CPAs to work on commission.3 CPAs who act as independent 
financial advisers, without an economic interest in their own 
recommendations, provide a differentiated product in the 
financial services market.4 In its haste to endorse the one-stop 
3 AICPA is a voluntary association; CPAs who prefer not to 
observe AICPA's Code of Professional Ethics need not join.
4 Dean Williams of the University of Southern California 
School of Accounting wrote that "[t]he single criterion that sets 
CPA firms apart from providers of non-audit services (e.g., 
financial planners, consulting firms, etc.) is the profession's 
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financial service concept, the Commission does not pause to 
consider that it is eliminating the ability of AICPA to create a 
differentiated service featuring independence and objectivity.
The Commission also does not linger over the possibility 
that eliminating AICPA's option to promote this market niche in 
connection with non-attest services may have adverse effects in 
the market for attest services. We are told that the 
independence of CPAs is of critical importance in capital 
formation. When the independence of CPAs is compromised by their 
involvement with corporate management in non-attest services, 
public confidence in their independent auditor function may be 
diminished. See Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
to Congress On the Accounting Profession and the Commission's 
Oversight Role 145-46 (July 1978). If true, this consent order 
could harm consumers.
Although there may be value in allowing CPAs to work on 
commission and to accept referral fees, the argument that the 
Federal Trade Commission is the appropriate institution to 
rewrite AICPA's restrictions is substantially less than 
compelling, particularly in the face of AICPA's concern with 
maintaining the fact and appearance of independence and 
objectivity for its members. The Commission does not have the 
expertise to make that judgment, and the better and wiser course 
is to let the market sort it out.5
reputation for independence and objectivity. It is in the 
public's interest that this reputation be perceived as an 
alternative in the market place. Otherwise, third party reliance 
on all services, and hence the very essence of capital formation, 
will be threatened.** Letter to FTC staff (July 30, 1986).
5 To the extent that state laws may inhibit the use of 
commissions and referral fees by CPAs, the Commission's order has 
no effect.
This case presents important questions about what 
constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act. The mandate of the Commission is to prevent 
unfair methods of competition, not to prescribe particular modes 
of competition in the absence of a violation of law. We should 
not engage in social engineering under the guise of law 
enforcement. AICPA's ethical rules reflect longstanding tenets 
of professionalism and could facilitate procompetitive 
alternatives in CPA services. The Commission should have 
attempted to understand the value of those tenets before changing 
the rules by fiat.
ISSUED: July 26, 1990
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SEPARATE STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER OWEN 
 CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART 
in American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
File No. 851-0020 Docket C.3297
In the consent order accepted today in this matter, the 
Commission prohibits the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants ("AICPA"), by way of its Code of Professional 
Conduct, from restricting its members from: (1) adopting certain 
referral fee and commission arrangements that may create 
conflicts of interest, and (2) using coercion, overreaching or 
harassment to solicit clients. I join Commissioner Azcuenaga in 
dissenting from this action.1
1Along with Commissioner Azcuenaga, I dissent from 
Paragraphs II.A.2, II.A.3, and II.A.4 of the order, and concur in 
the majority holding that AICPA's restrictions on advertising 
(Paragraphs II.A.5 and II.A.6) and certain contingent fees 
(Paragraph II.A.1) unlawfully restrain competition.
The Commission's achievements in protecting the public from 
anticompetitive restraints imposed by professional associations 
have earned the justified praise of antitrust observers. These 
accomplishments are exemplified by the provisions of this order 
governing restrictions on advertising. The application of 
antitrust doctrine in changing times necessarily demands some 
imagination on the part of federal law enforcers. However, this 
consent illustrates the dangers of going beyond "pushing the 
envelope" with insufficient evidentiary support.
Referral fees and commissions raise serious potential 
conflicts of interest between the CPA and his client, which could 
result in damaging financial consequences. The competitive 
effects of prohibiting such fees are not clear — either facially 
or in terms of how the prohibitions actually operate — and good 
economic evidence as to both is lacking. There are plausible 
efficiency arguments for such restraints, relating both to the 
elimination of potentially damaging conflicts of interest, and to 
preserving public confidence in the integrity and independence of 
members of the AICPA, in both attest and non-attest functions. 
The lack of evidence suggesting that these restrictions are 
anticompetitive stands in marked contrast to the evidence that 
has been compiled in connection with advertising bans,2 and the 
plethora of evidence in cases like Detroit Auto Dealers.3 
Accordingly, it has not been demonstrated to my satisfaction that 
the prohibition of commission and referral fee arrangements by 
the AICPA is inherently suspect under the Commission's analysis 
in Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 
541 (1988).
2See, e.q., Calvani, Langenfeld, & Shuford, Attorney 
Advertising and Competition at the Bar, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 761 
(1988).
3Docket No. 9189, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶22,653 (Feb. 22, 
1989).
The available evidence as to the market power of the AICPA 
is not compelling. The AICPA is a voluntary association.
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Membership and adherence to its particular Code are not 
prerequisites to practice as a CPA. In states that prohibit CPAs 
from accepting referral fees or commissions, today's order has no 
effect. In states without such restrictions, it is hard to 
envision any competitive problem; CPAs are free to undertake 
actions prohibited by the AICPA ethical standards by simply 
leaving the organization. In addition, CPAs apparently already 
face intense competition for non-attest services from non-CPAs, 
such as non-CPA accountants, tax preparers, and financial 
planners.4 While addressing what may be an illusory competitive 
problem, this order opens the door to potentially serious 
conflicts of interest, that may cause substantial consumer 
injury.
4By contrast, CPAs collectively may have substantial market 
power for attest services, since only CPAs can offer such 
services. Ironically, the majority correctly recognizes the 
efficiency of preventing potential conflicts of interest between 
CPAs and clients for attest services.
It has been suggested that disclosure of the fee arrangement 
itself solves the conflict of interest. There are several 
reasons why this may not be true. First, the relationship 
between the client and the CPA is of a sensitive, fiduciary 
nature, in which the trusting client seeks advice in areas where 
the client is untutored. That relationship may color the 
client's willingness to accept such a fee arrangement, even after 
disclosure, possibly to the client's considerable detriment. A 
client in this situation, because of the trust relationship
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involved, might not view such a fee arrangement with the same 
skepticism as disclosure of a similar arrangement from another 
type of salesman. In fact, it is entirely possible that the 
client does not view the CPA as a salesman at all. If a CPA 
discloses to his regular client that the CPA has received a fee 
for referring the client to another CPA for other services, the 
client may assume that the fiduciary's motive was to refer him to 
the best person for the job.5 That may not be true. Presumably, 
the purpose of the referral fee was to generate the referral, 
whether or not made to the best person for the job.
5Referral fees paid to commercial referral services may 
present different competitive questions and levels of 
efficiencies.
The fact that many consumers seek out a CPA for various non­
attest services, rather than alternate service providers, 
suggests that the objectivity of the CPA may be a highly 
important factor in the decision. This objectivity legitimately 
may be what the AICPA may seek to protect with its ban on 
referral fees and commissions. The ability to identify a 
trustworthy, objective service provider through membership in a 
professional association would plausibly decrease search costs 
and the risk of an adverse experience for consumers. 
Regrettably, the order ultimately prevents this alternative; the 
overriding benefits resulting from such a restriction are not 
clear.
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Second, disclosure of only the fact of a referral fee or 
commission may prove insufficient to protect consumers, unless 
they are also informed of other relevant information. For 
instance, there might be less expensive alternatives where the 
commission would be smaller, but the return to the client might 
be the same or greater. While the Commission's order would 
require the CPA to disclose that he would receive a commission, 
the CPA would not be required under the order to advise the 
client of those other alternatives. The information that would 
have to be disclosed to protect consumers from a conflict of 
interest would vary from situation to situation, and does not 
seem amenable to listing exhaustively in a Commission order. 
However, it does seem that only disclosing the fact that the 
commission or referral fee is to be paid is insufficient to 
vitiate the conflict of interest.
The benefits claimed for the consent order provisions on 
referral fees and commissions do not hold up under close 
scrutiny. For example, it is suggested that consumers now will 
be able to do "one-stop shopping," i.e., obtain accounting 
services, as well as other financial services, from the same 
individual. This alternative was already available, so long as 
an AICPA member did not violate the Code's restrictions on 
referral fees and commissions. Consumers could also obtain 
accounting services from a CPA, not a member of the AICPA, and, 
in those states that permit it, the CPA could also sell them
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financial products of any imaginable type, with any fee 
arrangement. Furthermore, with the lifting of the restrictions 
on contingent fees for many non-attest services in the instant 
order, such a fee alternative would be available for clients who 
might have difficulty affording an hourly rate or set fee up 
front.
In sum, I have identified several plausible efficiencies 
stemming from prohibitions against intra-professional referral 
fees and commissions, that seem at least as likely, if not 
significantly more likely, to benefit consumers than the proposed 
remedy. Before agreeing to any consent of this nature, I would 
need to see more evidence to conclude that prohibiting 
restrictions on referral fees and commissions is in the public 
interest.
Finally, the AICPA Code prohibits solicitation through "the 
use of coercion, overreaching, or harassing conduct." I concur 
in the opinion of Commissioner Azcuenaga that there is no 
evidentiary basis for challenging this rule.6 The restriction 
is not unlawful on its face, and, if it were demonstrated that it 
was enforced in an anticompetitive manner, the appropriate remedy 
would be to prohibit that offensive conduct, not the restriction 6
Paragraph II.A.4 of the order prohibits the AICPA from 
"[r]estricting, regulating, impeding, declaring unethical, 
advising members against, or interfering with . . . [t]he 
solicitation of any potential client by any means, including 
direct solicitation. ..."
6
itself. This order sends the wrong signal to other organizations 
that may wish, and indeed should even be encouraged, to adopt a 
legitimate rule of this nature.
ISSUED: July 26, 1990
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